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We study the impact of CEO equity-based compensation (EBC) on employee wages. 
Using pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as a measure for CEO equity-based compensation, 
we find that CEOs with higher EBC tend to pay their employees lower wages. We also 
examine the impact of EBC on average employee wage in different industries and find that 
such an impact is more evident in non-technology firms than in technology firms. Finally, 
we find that CEOs with higher pay-performance sensitivities are more likely to depress 
employee wages when the business cycle shows downturn. While the literature of CEO 
compensation suggests that EBC can mitigate agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, we find that the high level of EBC can create another aspect of agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, contributing to income inequality even 
within corporations. 
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The income inequality has been a growing social problem worldwide. Widening 
inequality can be destructive to society by impeding long-term growth.1  While many 
studies on income inequality illustrate the wealth difference between the top and the bottom 
levels in a country, it is more pronounced in developed countries. Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey (2013) point out that the increasing inequality in wages has been playing a 
significant role in aggravating overall income inequality within the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Johansson and Wang (2014) 
point out that suppressive financial policies will aggravate income inequality. Heyman 
(2005) points out that income inequality might be significant inside modern corporations. 
The aggravating income inequality is attributed to technology evolution and international 
trade (Atkinson, 2003; Levy and Temin, 2007). 
In the United States, income inequality has become increasingly severe and brought 
some detrimental effects on social stability since the late 1970s (Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey, 2013). While Milanovic (2012) finds that very high CEO compensation has been 
gradually and increasingly accepted in the United States since the 1960s, Stiglitz (2012) 
argues “rent-seeking”, where those in power enjoy additional income not from value 
creation, but from redirecting income attributed to others. We consider whether CEO 
incentive compensation leads to lower employee wages, potentially contributing to income 
inequality within the U.S. corporations. 
The literature suggests that CEO compensation is important in resolving agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers. While shareholders are interested in 
maximizing their firm values, managers readily pursue their own benefits at the expense of 
shareholders’ interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers with little or no 
ownership could waste firm’s resources for their own benefits away from shareholders’ 
interests. Therefore, agency conflicts become inherent in separation of ownership and 
control. 
                                                          
1 See Easterly, W. (2007), Stiglitz, J. (2009), Temple, J. (1999), and Clarke, G. (1995). 
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The agency conflicts can be reduced by optimal contracts with equity-based 
compensation (EBC) (Hölmstrom, 1979). When firms tie executive pay to firm 
performance by granting EBC, the interests of CEOs are better aligned with those of 
shareholders (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Mawani, 2003). Murphy (2012) explains that 
EBC comprises stock options and restricted stock as incentive compensation because EBC 
leads to a direct positive relationship between the CEOs’ compensation and stock-price 
performance. More specifically, CEOs will have greater motivation to increase stock-price 
performance. Therefore, EBC gives greater incentives to maximize the shareholders’ 
wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). However, CEOs with managerial power might still 
pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue 
that CEOs extract benefits in excess of what they should receive from incentive contracts, 
which makes incentive compensation also act as an agency problem.  
On the other hand, when CEOs are granted EBC, they might suppress employee wages 
and decrease expenses to firms. The lower expenses result in higher earnings, leading to 
higher operating performance and then to higher stock-price performance. Hence, CEO 
pay out of EBC should increase. That is, CEOs are motivated with EBC to improve firm 
performance and increase their own compensation. However, CEOs might suppress 
employee wages more when they are compensated with EBC than when they are 
compensated with salaries and bonus, which are not directly related to firm performance. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to posit that CEOs with a higher amount of EBC might curb 
employee wages more.  
However, EBC granted to CEOs will create another aspect of agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. The logic of this statement is as following. 
Shareholders hire CEOs to work hard for them to maximize the firm value. But when CEOs 
want to pursue their own benefits, if they cannot increase firm value, they would rather try 
to curb employee wages. As a result, agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
still exist. 
To examine the implications above, we collect compensation data from the 
Execucomp database, stock returns from CRSP, and accounting information from 
COMPUSTAT. We use panel data methodology, match corporations with work-related 
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data, and investigate how powerful EBC affects employee wages. In terms of the proxy for 
EBC, we use pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) as 
measures in order to capture the CEO incentive compensation more accurately, consistent 
with Murphy (2012). However, the relation between PPS and firm performance is still in 
debate. That is, when PPS increases, firm performance does not necessarily increase. If 
PPS does not lead to lower employee wages, this could be evidence that CEOs are 
extracting rents through wage suppression. 
The motivation of this paper is to examine whether equity-based compensation 
encourages managers to exacerbate income inequality by curbing employee wages for their 
own benefits. Most existing papers, such as Cronqvist et.al. (2009), Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) have studied how employee wages respond 
to managerial powers rather than to EBC. Since there is no study that examines the impact 
of CEO incentive compensation on employee wages directly, we attempt to contribute to 
the literature by filling the gap. 
The results of this paper suggest that EBC provided to managers has negative impacts 
on wages of average employees. The higher pay-performance sensitivities managers have, 
the lower the wages to employees. Moreover, such an impact is greater in non-technology 
firms than in technology firms and the relationship between EBC and employee wages is 
also specific to business cycles. CEOs with high PPS are more likely to suppress employee 
wages in firms which are in a bad state within a business cycle. To reduce income 
inequality in modern corporations, firms might have to grant EBC to both CEOs and 
employees. 
The remainder of our paper is as follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature. 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data we used in this study and 
the empirical models we implement to test the hypotheses and robustness. Section 5 
discusses the results and empirical findings. Section 6 presents the conclusion of our study. 
 
2. Literature Review 




Income inequality has been an unpleasant topic in the United States, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and all over the world. Levy 
and Temin (2007) study the growing income inequality in the United States by comparing 
the situations in earlier postwar years and that since 1980. They propose that income 
distribution in each of the two periods is driven mostly by economic institutions. They 
argue that there is not searing inequality in earlier postwar years because of the government 
regulation of distributing income. Furthermore, the income inequality from the 1980s to 
the present is due to the policy changes occurring in the late 1970s and early the 1980s, 
such as changes related to globalization. Venkatasubramanian (2009) investigates the 
distribution of wages in the United States. The author argues that CEOs are overpaid 
ridiculously in 2008, and the overpayment leads to the more severe income inequality 
between managers and average employees. He uses entropy which is a term in statistical 
mechanics and information theory as a proxy for fairness and then employs the principle 
of maximum entropy to express maximum fairness in economic systems. The author finally 
argues that the maximally fair distribution of income is the lognormal one. Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) focus on the growing income inequality in non-finance 
industries in the United States and examine how inequality can be influenced by the 
financialization of the U.S. economy from 1970 to 2008. They argue that the more non-
finance sectors rely on financial income, the greater the income disparities among workers 
of different levels.  
Atkinson (2003) investigates income inequality in OECD countries. He argues that in 
early postwar years, the income inequalities among OECD countries have been falling 
similarly but experience different rises since the 1980s. Income inequality in the United 
Kingdom is like a U-shape while that in Canada just starts increasing. The author also 
proposes that in the 1990s, income inequality in Canada still experienced a slight increase 
while that in the UK shows almost no change.  
Apparently, income inequality is a serious issue existing all over the world. Milanovic 
(2006) examines the relationship between globalization and worldwide income inequality. 
He argues that globalization influences income inequality. Such influences depend on 
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whether a country is poor or rich and may be different between densely-populated and 
underpopulated countries. 
There are also studies on the relationship between CEO compensation and income 
inequality. Kim, Kogut and Yang (2015) propose that since the late 1970s, the main reason 
for the impressive growth of U.S. income inequality is that the compensation to the top 
earners has grown even faster than the firm size. Moreover, the top earners are mostly 
comprised of CEOs. Gabaix and Landier (2008) also point out that CEO pay has increased 
dramatically between 1980 and 2003. However, Blackwell, Anderson, Hefner and Vaught 
(2015) investigate the CEO pay and wealth inequality using the data of CEO’s salary and 
total compensation between 1993 and 2013 in the US. They find that CEO compensation 
has fallen while wealth inequality has risen. 
 
2.2 Agency Conflicts from Separation of Ownership and Control 
 
Agency conflicts are common in many enterprises due to the difference between the 
goals of shareholders and the goals of managers who have little or no security ownership 
of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this paper, we confine the cause of agency 
conflicts to the separation of ownership and control, which is consistent with Berle and 
Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
Berle and Means (1932) propose that there are many drawbacks when the owner of 
an enterprise is also a manager. They advocate for the separation of ownership and control. 
However, such a separation will lead to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when there is separation of ownership and control, 
managers are not motivated to improve firm performance. Instead, managers will tend to 
squander corporate resources to maximize their own benefits. Such behaviors of managers 
will result from the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders of the enterprise. 
Jensen (1986) investigates agency conflicts when there is large free cash flow in the 
firm. He argues that there is divergence of the goals of shareholders and managers. The 
shareholders want the managers to utilize the free cash to increase the value of stocks, 
while managers are more inclined to spend free cash on expanding the firm size, which is 
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positively related to their compensation. Moreover, they sometimes invest in some projects 
with negative net present value (NPV), which can contribute to the growth of firm size. 
The author also points out that the two methods to mitigate such agency conflicts are 
issuing debt and threat of takeover. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the agency conflicts caused by separation of 
ownership and control can be reduced by setting up appropriate organizational forms 
through both internal and external mechanisms. In terms of internal mechanisms, managers 
and owners are assigned different tasks. More specifically, managers are responsible for 
initiating and implementing decisions, while owners are responsible for evaluating and 
monitoring. Threat of takeover can act as an external mechanism to mitigate such agency 
conflicts. The bidder can obtain control rights by purchasing stocks. The authors point out 
that in this way, the agency conflicts can be decreased effectively. 
 
2.3 Structure of CEO Compensation 
 
There is a vast literature that exploring ways to alleviate agency conflicts by 
implementing CEO compensation schemes. Murphy (1999) separates components of 
executive compensation by categorizing it into four type: base salaries; bonuses; stock 
options and restricted stocks; the long-term incentive plans. Murphy (2012) strengthens his 
previous viewpoint and takes a closer look at the components of the CEO compensation 
package by also examining non-equity incentives and other pay, such as perquisites. 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) point out that there was an evolution of CEO compensation 
occurring during the 1970s and the increase of executive compensation has been witnessed 
since then. Kaplan (2012) finds out that the CEO compensation level which surged in the 
1990s has decreased since then. 
There are studies regarding the determinants of executive compensation. Cheng, 
Venezia and Lou (2013) propose that there is a positive relationship between the CEO’s 
compensation and the extent of internationalization as well as firm size. In contrast, 
executive compensation level is negatively related to the degree of industrial diversification. 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) set up an equilibrium model to determine whether the 
substantial enhancement in firm size will lead to the rise in CEO compensation. They 
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propose that from 1980 to 2003, the increment of total market capitalization, which is used 
as proxy for the firm size, of large corporations can well explain the growth of CEO 
compensation in the United States. By using Indian firms as the data sample, Parthasarathy, 
Menon and Bhattacherjee (2006) provide evidence that not only CEO total compensation 
but also the fraction of incentive compensation to total compensation has significantly 
positive impact on firm size, which is used as a control variable in their study.  
In terms of riskiness, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Kraft and Niederprüm (1999), 
and Garen (1994) all provide evidence that increasing the risk of the firm should reduce 
the level of CEO compensation. Also, different compensation components relate to firm 
risk differently. Jin (2002) conducts a further study to test the relation between executive 
compensation and risk level by categorizing risk into systematic risk and non-systematic 
risk, which is also known as firm-specific risk. He argues that CEO compensation 
decreases when the firm-specific risk increases. However, it is hard to examine how 
systematic risk influences the incentive level. Nohel and Todd (2004) suggest that 
managers’ incentives to invest are complex issues and are closely related to the option 
strike prices, the degree of risk aversion of managers, the career concerns of the executives 
as well as managers’ current and future wealth.  
On the other hand, Graham, Li and Qiu (2012) suggest that in addition to the 
observable firm and managers’ attributes (such as firm size and managers’ age), the latent 
ones are also significant influencing factors on the executive compensation level. Bathala 
(1996) suggests that CEO’s equity ownership, especially equity-based compensation 
(EBC), is conducive to reducing agency costs. The author then takes a closer look at the 
influencing factors of the CEO’s stock ownership and finds that the corporation’s level of 
debt and free cash flow have a positive impact on the CEO’s stock ownership, while firm 
size has a negative impact on the CEO’s stock ownership. This finding is somewhat 
surprising and contradictory to the conclusions of Parthasarathy, Menon and Bhattacherjee 
(2006). However, their variables are not synchronous as the dependent variable (the CEO’s 
stock ownership) and some independent variables (such as firm size) were measured in 
different time periods. Moreover, Chung and Pruitt (1996) study the interaction of the 
CEO’s pay and firm performance. The authors perform a three-stage least-squares (3SLS) 
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regression model to resolve the endogeneity problem of independent variables and find that 
managerial stock ownership and firm value influence each other. Chemmanur, Cheng and 
Zhang (2013) propose that in firms, leverage has a significantly positive effect on the 
CEO’s total compensation, cash compensation as well as equity-based compensation 
(EBC). 
There is a heated debate among these authors on whether the CEO compensation level 
is reasonable. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) suggest that the compensation to managers should 
be open to the public. They find that there is little effect of CEO compensation on the 
shareholders’ wealth and suggest that the level of CEO compensation should be limited. 
Moreover, due to the enterprise management scandals, which have become prevalent since 
2001, the public is convinced of the phenomenon that the existence of CEO compensation 
may not actually serve the interests of shareholders. On the other hand, several studies also 
propose that the CEO compensation is not excessive. Murphy (1986a) points out that on 
average, the compensation package does indeed motivate managers to act in the interest of 
shareholders. Accordingly, managers are not overpaid. Parthasarathy, Menon and 
Bhattacherjee (2006) suggest that in the firms which are regulated by the government, 
CEOs are underpaid. Furthermore, Jensen and Murphy (1990b) suggest that the blame of 
public for the high pay to CEOs is irrational. They argue that the compensation level is 
actually decreasing, and such phenomena never should have happened because the 
compensation scheme is very significant in alleviating agency problems to corporations. 
There are two approaches to the study of executive compensation. The more 
widespread method is the optimal contracting approach, under which CEOs are given 
incentive contracts to maximize shareholders’ value. Murphy (1986b) extends the 
incentive contracts to more than two periods and strengthens the concept of the optimal 
contract. However, some studies find that there are limitations to the optimal contacting 
approach. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that there is an agency problem not only 
between the shareholders and the CEOs, but also between shareholders and directors. 
Directors always act on behalf of the CEOs because CEOs have the right to appoint 
directors and decide their rates of pay (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; Main, 1993). 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) provide evidence of the alignment between directors and 
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executives by illustrating that when CEOs attend the process of nominating directors, the 
directors are more likely to be on the side of the CEOs. While the compensation scheme 
for directors is still in debate, we focus only on the issue of CEO compensation.  
The other approach to explore CEO compensation is the managerial power approach, 
under which the compensation package can be in part an agency conflict itself. The 
managers have power to affect pay to themselves and as a result they have the ability to 
extract rent, which is the compensation above what they deserve to receive through the 
optimal contract. Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) propose that managers’ extraction of 
rent can result in inadequate compensation schemes and suboptimal contracts. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) considered the emergence of managers’ power as proof 
that the contract is not optimal and thus the reform of CEO pay is needed. Core, Guay and 
Thomas (2005) put forward some contrasting views. They argue that the two approaches 
are not mutually exclusive. They suggest that when CEOs are more powerful, it does not 
necessarily mean that the compensation policy needs to be fixed. There is also a dispute 
about whether government intervention is essential in this issue. While Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) propose a supportive perspective to government intervention, the views of Core, 
Guay and Thomas (2005) are quite the opposite. They point out that, when taking the rise 
of executive compensation into consideration, government intervention cannot be proved 
to be essential. In contrast, Murphy (2012) demonstrates that the government intervention 
into executive pay is the inevitable choice in the historical development of CEO 
compensation. While there are several aspects of executive compensation, we only focus 
on the EBC because other components in executive compensation do not provide 
managerial incentives. 
 
2.4 Equity-Based Compensation (EBC) 
 
While studies have examined different components of CEO compensation, EBC is 
more efficient to align the goals of shareholders and CEOs than other components of 
compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a; Murphy, 1999; Walker, 2011). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) demonstrate that enhancement of manager’s equity ownership will 
prevent them from abusing corporate resources, which are otherwise used to increase their 
10 
 
own perquisites and build their business empire. In this way, firm value will increase, 
which is the goal of shareholders, and thus the agency costs will be reduced. Fama (1980) 
proposes that in order to resolve the conflicts which such separation may bring about, the 
best solution is to give managers stocks as an incentive contract. In addition, he argues that 
the concept proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that the corporation is a set of 
contracts needs to be promoted. He made modifications to the view of the “firm as a set of 
contracts” by noting that there is also a separation of management and risk taking. Thus, 
opportunism and moral hazards will come into being. In his opinion, these problems can 
be solved by setting up an efficient managerial labor market because the current 
performance of managers will influence how much pay they will receive in the future. In 
this way, he illustrates that the separation of ownership and control rights is an effective 
organizational form.  
Ofek and Yermack (2000) investigate the varying degrees of efficacy of different 
levels of equity-based compensation. The authors use the compensation data sample from 
1992 to 1995 to test such relationships and find that the quantity of stocks owned by 
managers changes dynamically based on two forces. The first one is the board’s goal to 
align the interests of managers with those of shareholders by using equity-based 
compensation. The second force is the managers’ desire to diversify risk by selling stocks. 
They illustrate that, when the level of managerial ownership is low, granting EBC can 
motivate managers to act on behalf of shareholders. However, when managers already own 
a large number of shares and they are given new equity compensation, they tend to sell 
shares that they already own in order to diversify risk. As a result, EBC loses its 
effectiveness. Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) use a panel data set of 434 firms to 
investigate the relation between the CEO’s stock ownership and capital structure decisions. 
They document that when managers are given more EBC, they tend to select the capital 
structure with higher leverage, which will be more likely to increase their firm value.  
There are studies on the relationship between the fraction of stocks owned by 
managers and the firm’s market value. However, the conclusions vary. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) split board ownership into three categories and then employ a piecewise 
linear regression model to estimate the relation between the fraction of stocks owned by 
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managers and Tobin’s Q. They find that the relation is not monotonic. The authors illustrate 
that Tobin’s Q goes up when ownership is between 0% and 5%, then down between 5% 
and 25% and then up until the end. In a related study, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find 
that the relation between the fraction of stocks owned by managers and Tobin’s Q follows 
a smooth curve and Tobin’s Q keeps increasing at a descending rate as long as the CEO’s 
stock ownership is below approximately 45%. After the stock ownership reaches about 
45%, Tobin’s Q decreases at an increasing rate. Later, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use 
a similar method to that of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), but take into account the 
tenure of managers. They show something different from previous findings. They find that 
the relation is a more perplex curvilinear relation with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. 
The slope is positive when the ownership grows from 0% to 1% and 5% to 20%, and 
negative when the ownership is between 1% and 5% and bigger than 20%.  
However, there are some studies which provide puzzling conclusions. For example, 
Lorderer and Martin (1997) use the data of 867 domestic acquisitions to test the importance 
of stock-based incentives. They find that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
firm performance, which is related to shareholders’ wealth, increases with the higher 
stockholdings of CEOs. In their study, high stock ownership by CEOs leads to more severe 
appropriation of corporate resources. 
Mehran (1995) examines circumstances under which more EBC will be granted to 
CEOs and finds that the EBC package increases with a growing number of outside directors 
and decreases with the existence of large outside shareholders, who can oversee CEOs 
without using incentive contracts. Mehran (1995) also shows that both high firm 
performance and more growth opportunities are positively correlated to the high percentage 
of EBC in the total compensation package, as well as to the high fraction of shares owned 
by managers. 
Ryabkov (2014) studies the optimal compensation model and shows that, in the EBC 
package, stock options are superior to stocks given to the managers due to two reasons. 
First, granting more stock options rather than stocks can save shareholders some more 
expenses. Second, stock options will give managers more risk-taking incentives compared 
to stocks. Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) also propose that stock options are a significant 
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element not only of total CEO compensation, but also of EBC to CEOs. However, Walker 
(2011) suggests that, from the beginning of 2006, stocks replaced stock options to play a 
vital role in the EBC package. However, it is difficult to explain why such an evolution 
arises because the change might be related to characteristics of firms, their employees, or 
the market as a whole. 
Edmans et al. (2012) use a dynamic model to illustrate how to make an efficient 
optimal contract in the dynamic world. They point out that the EBC package given to 
managers cannot motivate them all the time. When there is a situation in which the firm 
value declines, EBC will lose its value and thus CEOs will find ways to maximize their 
personal savings. Under such circumstances, the incentives given by EBC will decrease 
substantially. By conducting a dynamic incentives contract, CEOs will be given constant 
motivations both in the present and the future. 
Laux and Laux (2009) examine the relations among board committees, EBC and the 
audit committee on the basis that there exists a good reaction mechanism. They conclude 
that the separation of the rights of setting CEO compensation and monitoring managers 
will result in high EBC. The authors argue that such high levels of compensation may not 
cause high levels of earnings management in turn, because the audit committee will spend 
more effort monitoring CEOs. 
 
2.5 Measures of Equity-Based Compensation (EBC) 
 
Inspired by Murphy (2012), we measure EBC through two ways: pay-performance 
sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS). In terms of the definitions of PPS 
and PVS, we follow the viewpoints proposed by Core and Guay (2002). PPS is defined as 
the “Dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock 
price”. PVS is defined as the “Dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a 0.01 
change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns”. 
According to the compensation package, there are two calculation methods: “grant-
date pay” and “realized pay” (Murphy, 2012; Kaplan, 2012). Kaplan (2012) suggests that 
“realized pay” should be utilized because it does a better job of capturing the value of stock 
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options that CEOs actually receive. There are also other studies using ‘grant-date pay’ as 
the proxy. For example, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) utilize the grant-date value of the 
compensation package to examine the growth of CEO pay. 
PPS increased dramatically in the 1990s. This is mainly driven by the sharp growth 
of stock options holdings (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 1999). There are many 
studies finding a positive relation between the CEO’s pay and firm performance. Kaplan 
(2012) argues that pay to CEOs is positively correlated with firm performance. In order not 
to be penalized, CEOs attempt to improve firm performance. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
investigate pay-performance sensitivities by constructing a panel data set of hundreds of 
large public companies from 1980 to 1994. The authors put forward the view that the 
CEO’s pay is strongly positively related to firm performance. They also point out that high 
pay-performance sensitivities are almost completely explained by equity-based 
compensation. Murphy (1985) combines the cross-section data and time-series data and 
then sets up the regression of CEO’s pay from six categories of total compensation on firm 
performance, which is measured by sales growth and common shareholders returns instead 
of accounting profit. The author provides evidence that CEO’s pay is significantly positive 
to firm performance after controlling for various firm characteristics. 
Conyon and Peck (1998) reach a conclusion that the correlation between pay and 
performance is higher when outsiders are playing a leading role in boards and remuneration 
committees. Following the method of Jensen and Murphy (1990a) used to measure PPS, 
Yermack (1996) examines the relation between board size and EBC. The author finds that 
the corporation with a small boards tends to have a larger firm value and higher PPS. Kraft 
and Niederprüm (1999) study the relation between pay-performance sensitivities and 
ownership structure. More specifically, they point out that pay-performance sensitivities 
are smaller when there is a large shareholder playing a predominant role. 
Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) propose that it is better for firms to conduct a linear 
pay-performance relationship because either a convex or concave one will produce 
problems. The most severe problem is that the managers will not always pursue the 
maximization of firm value to attain the highest pay. More recently, Abedin and Pyo (2015) 
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examine the relation between PPS and firm performance and find that PPS is positively 
related to firm performance. 
However, there are some studies providing some puzzling conclusions. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990a) use a dataset of 10,400 CEOs from 1,295 companies from 1974 to 1986 
to examine the relation between the CEO’s pay from different components of 
compensation and firm performance. They employ the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model and then provide evidence that pay-performance sensitivities are small. 
With regard to many big firms, the CEO’s pay is independent of firm performance so that 
there is a lack of efficient incentive mechanisms. The authors attribute the weak connection 
between pay and performance to the combination of many factors, such as political stress 
and firm size. They propose that small firms tend to have higher pay-performance 
sensitivities. Parthasarathy, Menon and Bhattacherjee (2006) study the relation between 
executive pay and firm performance by using net profit margin (NPM) and return on assets 
(ROA) as proxies for firm performance. They find that there is no relation between either 
the total executive pay or the fraction of incentive pay to total pay and firm performance. 
However, Murphy and Jensen (2011) propose several precautions about deciding pay-
performance sensitivities. They argue that using ratios such as ROA, earnings per share 
(EPS), and return on equity (ROE) to measure firm performance is questionable because 
managers may only care about how to manipulate such ratios.  
Despite many advocates of aligning pay to performance, some studies question the 
rationality of that practice. Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2014) regress the one-year-ahead 
measures of stock performance and operating performance on the total compensation 
minus total cash compensation, which is used as a measure of the CEO’s incentive pay in 
the current year after controlling for the influence of managerial style in the model. They 
find that high executive pay has an adverse impact on future stock performance and 
operating performance. Nohel and Todd (2004) argue that using pay-performance 
sensitivities to measure CEO compensation is flawed because when pay-performance 
sensitivities are high enough for the managers, motivation for managers to increase their 
firm value will decrease. 
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Michaud and Gai (2009) examine the reciprocity between CEO pay and firm 
performance. When they set firm performance as the dependent variable, they find that it 
has little relation with executive compensation. The authors then study the impact of firm 
performance on CEO pay and document that the impact is small. Moreover, the firm size, 
which is measured by sales, is the vital determinant of CEO pay. 
Now we move forward to discuss the existing research on the other measure of EBC: 
pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS). Recall that the separation of managers’ control and 
ownership will lead managers to forgo risky projects even though they may have positive 
net present value (NPV). Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) propose that the CEO’s incentive 
pay is positively associated with stock return volatility. Therefore, EBC can induce 
managers to invest in risky projects which will result in higher volatility and then higher 
CEO pay. In addition, the authors also find that there is a significant positive relation 
between cash compensation and PVS. More specifically, higher PVS lead to higher cash 
compensation. 
Core and Guay (2002) investigate the methods of deriving the stock option portfolio 
value and the sensitivities of the option value to stock price and return volatility. For 
convenience, the authors use the ‘one-year approximation’ (OA) method to do the 
estimation which means getting access to data only from the current year’s proxy statement 
or annual report. They argue that the ‘one-year approximation’ method is better and has 
fewer errors when compared to other methods. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) employ a 
three-stage least-squares (3SLS) regression model to study PVS by controlling for PPS and 
including firm variables such as investment policy and leverage. The authors provide 
evidence that higher PVS will lead to much riskier investment policies and higher leverage. 
In addition, risky policies will lead to higher PVS but lower PPS in turn. They also point 
out that the stock return volatility has a positive impact on both PPS and PVS. Benson, 
Park and Davidson (2014) use mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as a tool to investigate 
the effects of sensitivity of the CEO’s pay to stock return volatility. They find that PVS is 
positively related to the probability of industrial diversification and negatively related to 
post-merger equity risk. More specifically, high PVS will result in the high likelihood of 
acquiring a target firm from a different industry and will generate a lower equity risk after 
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the merger happens. While we do not expect PVS to have material impacts on employee 
wages, we still consider PVS relative to employee wages because PVS is an important 
measure of managerial incentives with PPS. 
 
2.6 Employee Wages Relative to Capital Structure 
 
There are far fewer existing studies on employee wages than on executive 
compensation. From the prior literature on employee wages, we find that, in addition to 
executive compensation, the quantity of lower-level employee wages is also influenced by 
many aspects. Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) argue that firm leverage has a 
significantly positive influence on average employee pay. The authors also point out that 
such an influence is more obvious in nontechnology firms when compared to technology 
firms. Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010) investigate the optimal labor contract for the 
levered firms. In levered firms, bankruptcy costs, which are borne by employees, can offset 
the tax shields of debt. Therefore, firms with higher leverage have more labor risks, and 
thus will pay employees higher wages. The authors also find that firms with substantial 
capital tend to pay employees more.  
Hovakimian and Li (2011) examine the effect of capital structure on employee wages 
by using Chinese firms as the data sample. They set up a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) 
regression model and find evidence that firms with more debt tend to pay lower employee 
wages, which is consistent with Hanka (1998). The authors also find that firm size and 
profitability are two critical factors influencing employee wages. More specifically, 
smaller firms and less profitable firms are more likely to pay lower employee wages than 
other firms. 
Bell and Reenen (2011) classify workers into four categories: CEOs, senior managers, 
junior managers and average employees. They then investigate the impact of firm 
performance on the wages of workers. They find that the wages of senior managers are 
more sensitive to firm performance, while the sensitivities of the wages of junior managers 
as well as average employees to firm performance are quite low. With regard to CEOs, 




Bae, Kang and Wang (2011) investigate the influence of the firm-employee 
relationship on the capital structure decision. They find a negative relation between firm 
leverage and employee benefits. More specifically, the lower the ability to treat employees 
well, the higher the firm leverage is. Moreover, such a relation is more outstanding in firms, 
which encounter the financial crisis, and also in which employees are playing a significant 
role in the corporation’s operation. 
 
2.7 Employee Wages Relative to Managerial Powers 
 
Except for the influence of capital structure on employee wages, many researchers 
have also tested the impact of managerial powers on employee wages within corporations. 
Generally, the variation of managerial power will lead to different levels of employee 
wages. 
Cronqvist et.al. (2009) use panel data including firms, subsidiaries and workers levels 
to examine the effect of managerial entrenchment on employee wages. They consider CEO 
control measured by voting rights and CEO incentives measured by cash flow rights as 
proxies for the degree of managerial entrenchment. The authors provide evidence that more 
powerful managers pay their employees higher wages in order to get some personal 
benefits. The worker-level data also helps the authors investigate what kinds of employees 
can enjoy greater benefits from entrenched managers. While powerful CEOs can pay their 
employees more for CEOs’ personal benefits, CEOs with a higher PPS might pay their 
employees less because they might not be able to appreciate personal benefits as do 
powerful CEOs. 
However, there is a heated debate between managers and shareholders about whether 
to grant high employee wages. Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that managers with more 
control and less stock ownership are motivated to pay their workers more. Such policies 
can protect the firm from being taken over. In this way, there is an alliance between 
managers and employees when faced with corporate raiders. They also propose that the 
employees are motivated to protect high wages.  Thus, higher wages leads to a stronger 
alliance between managers and employees, particularly when employees also own shares 
of the firm. However, shareholders whose goal is to maximize firm value may be the 
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opponents of such practice. The authors’ viewpoints are consistent with that of Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003), who also illustrate that workers’ wages will increase when the 
possibility of being taken over is lower. Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) employ a 
‘differences-in-differences’ method to estimate the effect of anti-takeover legislation on 
employee wages. They follow the view of Jensen (1986), where takeover is a feasible way 
to mitigate agency conflicts. Therefore, they deduce that anti-takeover provisions will 
increase managerial discretion. Thus, the effect exerted by anti-takeover laws can measure 
the level of managerial discretion to some extent. Finally, the authors provide evidence that 
anti-takeover laws lead to the growth of employee wages. Rather than studying the 
determinants of employee wages in general, we only focus on how equity-based 
compensation influence average employee wages. 
We examine whether EBC will curb employee wages, even though it is efficient in 
mitigating agency conflicts inherent in separation of ownership and control. Thus, the wage 
inequality created by EBC within corporations might be more severe and furthermore 
might exacerbate income inequality within the whole society. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 
Recall that when the rights of control and ownership are separated, managers will take 
advantage of the principal’s authorization to increase their own benefits instead of pursuing 
the maximization of corporation value and shareholders’ wealth, which will thus cause the 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Also recall that granting equity-
based compensation to managers can help alleviate such agency conflicts by aligning the 
interests of managers and shareholders. 
Therefore, when CEOs are granted high equity-based compensation (EBC), they are 
motivated to increase the firm performance. CEOs are more willing to restrain employee 
wages because the firm performance can be enhanced in this way. More specifically, we 
can explain this through the income statement of a firm. When the employee wages are 
suppressed, the expenses will be reduced and then the profits will go up relatively. The 
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growth of the firm profits indicates that the firm performance increases as well. Hence, 
CEOs with high EBC will receive more compensation than they deserve. 
While employees’ productivity might decrease due to the suppression of their wage, 
CEOs can still control the extent of the suppression for own benefits of EBC. For example, 
they can reduce the rate of increase in wages when they receive more EBC relative to when 
they receive less EBC. In the literature of CEO compensation, it is still hard to establish 
positive relations between EBC and firm performance. That is, CEOs with powerful EBC 
packages might allow calculated losses in employees’ productivity and still enjoy their own 
lucrative compensation at the expense of their low level employees by suppressing wages. 
In the absence of explicit positive relations between EBC and firm performance, CEOs 
might be interested in their own compensation more than employees’ compensation and 
then suppress employee wages. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is:  
H1: There is a negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivities and 
employee wages. More specifically, CEOs with higher pay-performance sensitivities pay 
their workers lower wages. 
Cronqvist et.al. (2009) provide some related evidence to reinforce our Hypothesis 1. 
They propose that higher managerial entrenchment can lead to higher employee wages. 
The authors use an indicator variable in their model to measure the power of control and 
then point out that when the managers own more control rights, they are more entrenched. 
Therefore, these managers tend to grant higher workers’ pay in order to maintain a good 
relationship between them and employees. However, financial incentives may mitigate 
such behavior. 
To test Hypothesis 1, we set up the model by using PPS as the measure of EBC to the 
manager. In addition, leverage is a significant firm characteristic in our model when testing 
how EBC influences employee wages. So we set firm leverage as a main control variable. 
When a firm is highly leveraged, it is more likely to go bankrupt. Employees might 
ask for higher wages to be compensated from higher probability of bankruptcy. Myers 
(1977) first proposes one of the bargaining tools. He points out that when the firm is issuing 
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debt, there always exists an underinvestment problem. The managers tend to give up some 
projects even of positive NPV because most of benefits are enjoyed by the creditors. Such 
an underinvestment problem can be used as a bargaining tool by the firm. Therefore, risk-
averse employees will demand high wages as compensation before the negotiation starts. 
Perotti and Spier (1993) also propose that leverage can be used by the firm to bargain with 
the employees over their wages. 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) provide evidence of the positive impact of firm 
leverage on average employee wage by conducting several empirical models. They also 
find that such an impact is significant. Hence, we examine Hypothesis 2 to see whether the 
relation found by Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) still holds in the existent of EBC 
to CEOs. 
H2: There is a positive influence of firm leverage on average employee wages in the 
existence of EBC granted to CEOs. 
There is some existing literature studying the EBC as well as the relation between 
capital structure and employee pay within different industries. Several researchers 
(Anderson, Banker and Ravindran, 2000; Murphy, 2003) point out that in technology firms, 
managers own a greater fraction of stock options to total compensation. They also argue 
that such a difference is produced by many economic aspects. 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) examine the influence of leverage on employee 
wages while taking the industry into consideration. The authors categorize firms into 
technology and nontechnology firms and then examine the CEO compensation in these 
firms respectively. They find that CEOs in technology firms can obtain more total 
compensation on average and nontechnology firms tend to have higher firm leverage. The 
authors also argue that the impact of leverage on employee wages is greater in 
nontechnology firms. 
Therefore, we can expect that the incentive schemes in various industries, especially 
the EBC package, are different and that the impact of capital structure on average employee 
wages is different as well. Recall that capital structure of the firm also influences EBC. 
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Therefore, we are interested in differential impacts of EBC on employee wages among 
industries in technology or non-technology. 
Hence, hypothesis 3 is: 
H3: The relationship between pay-performance sensitivities and employee wages is 
specific to industries related to technology or not. 
EBC package is an efficient incentive plan for CEOs, but the value of such a 
compensation package changes all the time within different business cycles. Yang (2005) 
investigates the agency conflicts and corporate governance under different business 
conditions. The author argues that in the good states of business cycles, shareholder rights 
can contribute to decreasing managerial discretion, especially when there is free cash flow. 
However, in the bad states, shareholder rights will cause the more serious agency conflicts 
between creditors and shareholders. The author also argues that the debt structure changes 
within business cycles.  
In addition, the bankruptcy possibility varies in different states of business cycles. 
More specifically, when in the good states, the firm bankruptcy probability is low and the 
situation is quite contrary when the economy moves to bad states. Such circumstances will 
also influence the extent that firms bargain with employees for their wages. 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) utilize Z-score to express the probability of a 
corporation going into bankruptcy and then categorize the companies in their dataset into 
financially safe companies and financially distressed companies. They find that the 
influence of firm leverage on average employee wage is significant in financially safe 
companies but insignificant in financially distressed companies. 
As discussed above, EBC package given to CEOs and the impact of capital structure 
on average employee wage will keep changing according to different states of business 
cycles. Likewise, it is reasonable to conjecture that the impact of equity-based 
compensation on employee wages is also different within the business cycles. However, 
there is limited literature about this issue. Therefore, we set up Hypothesis 4 to fill this gap.  
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H4: The relationship between pay-performance sensitivities and employee wages is 
specific to whether the economy is in good state or bad state. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
 
We use compensation data during the period from January, 1992 to December, 2014. 
The identification of CEO is found through “CEOANN” variable in Execucomp database. 
Recall that we use pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) 
to measure CEO equity-based compensation (EBC). Our data of compensation to CEO are 
collected from Execucomp database. When calculating PVS, our data of stock return to 
shareholders are collected from CRSP database. Because the main identifier for the firms 
in Execucomp is “GVKEY” and “CUSIP” variables while that in CRSP is “CUSIP”, we 
merge Execucomp and CRSP databases using the “CUSIP” variable. It is worth mention 
that the data in the Execucomp database before 2006 and after 2006 has different reporting 
formats. So our calculation method of CEO compensation is also different for 1992-2006 
and 2007-2014. In addition, to calculate the option value using the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model, we obtain risk-free rate from historical data provided by the Federal Reserve on 
their website for “Treasury constant maturities” using the “annual” series. Consistent with 
the prior literature, we eliminate finance firms and utilities because such firms have 
different operating mechanisms and regulatory policies when compared to the others. 
We use “COPEROL” and “YEAR” variables to identify the cross-section and time 
series in our panel data set, respectively. To avoid the huge numerical difference among 
the variables in our regression model, we take the natural log of pay-performance 
sensitivities in our empirical work. After deleting the missing values of the natural log of 
PPS, we have 34,248 firm-year observations during the sample period. In terms of the 
computation of employee wages, we use the natural log of average employees pay which 
is calculated as “Labor and related expenses” (XLR, data item 42) divided by “The number 
of employees” (EMP, data item 29), variables provided by COMPUSTAT database. We 
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use the “employee wages” variable to represent the total labor costs.2 There are 49,842 
firm-year observations containing the average employee information from 1992 to 2014. 
Because only approximately ten percent of firms report “Labor and related expenses” 
(XLR, data item 42) in COMPUSTAT, the problem of sample-selection bias will be 
generated. More details regarding this problem will be discussed in section 4.4. 
We collect annual data on firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT during the time 
period of January, 1992 to December, 2014, which include “Total Assets” (AT, data item 
6), “Number of Common Shares Outstanding” (CSHO, data item 25), “Close Price of the 
Company’s Stock for the Fiscal Year” (PRCC_F, data item 199), “Total Long-term Debt” 
(DLTT, data item 9), “Total Debt in Current Liabilities” (DLC, data item 34), “Net Sales” 
(SALE, data item 12), “Earnings Before Interest and Taxes” (EBIT, data item 178) and 
“Retained Earnings” (RE, data item 36). We also include some important control variables 
in our regression models which will be discussed more in section 4.2-4.7. We estimate firm 
size using the natural log of market capitalization which is calculated by multiplying a 
company’s number of shares outstanding by the current market price of one share. 
Following the method used by Leary and Roberts (2010), we measure leverage as market 
leverage ratio which is calculated by the total debt (DLTT+DLC) divided by the sum of 
total debt and market value of equity (CSHO× PRCC_F). We use market-to-book ratio of 
the firm to gauge the investment opportunities of the firm, which is defined as market value 
of assets to book value of assets (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). Following Chemmanur, 
Cheng and Zhang (2013), we compute the physical capital intensity as the gross property, 
plant and equipment scaled by total assets (PPEGT, data item 7/AT, data item 6). Physical 
capital intensity is also used to capture the growth opportunities of the firm. Quits rates3 of 
different industries from 2001 to 2014 are collected from the database of Job Openings and 
Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 
industry classification which JOLTS uses is based on the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS). In order to capture the industry effects in our regression 
                                                          
2 According to the variable explanation stated by COMPUSTAT, data item 42 contains not only employee 
wages and salaries, but also incentive compensation and other benefit plans, hence actually, we include 
several types of employee pay in our “employee wages” variable. 




models, we implement the Fama and French 48-industry classification method to 
categorize firms into several different industries using the Standard Industrial 
Classification codes and then construct the industry dummies.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of key variables used in the regression 
analysis of the determinants of employee wages. The dependent variable, average 
employee pay, has a mean of $75,990, a median of $57,503, and a standard deviation of 
$71,936. Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) use information on employee wages from 
1992 to 2006. According to their results, the average employee pay has a mean of $32,760 
and a median of $32,000. The descriptive statistics of average employee wage are different 
between their study and ours because we have different industry distribution of data 
samples. Increases in labor expenses since 2006 might be another reason for the difference. 
The main independent variable, PPS, has a mean of $879,276 and a median of $205,999. 
The mean number implies that the average CEO’s wealth changes by $879,276 per 1% 
change in their firms’ stock price. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) examine the PPS of 
the CEO from 1992 to 2002. According to the summary statistics provided by them, PPS 
has a mean of $600,000 and a median of $206,000. Distinct time periods of our data 
samples cause distinct summary statistics of PPS. More specifically, the increase of PPS 
since 2002 can bring about the data difference. Since powerful CEOs have been heavily 
granted with EBC, their pay-performance sensitivities influence mean PPS more than 
median PPS. Therefore, it is feasible to focus on the median rather than the mean of PPS 
to analyze the incentive compensation of CEOs (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  
Table 2 shows the sample correlations of key variables used in the analysis of the 
impacts on employee wages. We note that nearly all of the correlations of any of the two 
different variables are significant at the 1% level, which means that changes in one variable 
significantly relate to changes in the another variable. “Wage” and “Avgsale” has a 
correlation coefficient of 0.684, which means these two variables have a strong relationship. 
The absolute value of coefficients of correlations of “PPS” and “PVS”, “Size” and “PPS”, 
“Size” and “PVS”, “Leverage” and “MTB” are between 0.4 and 0.59, which means the 
variables have a moderate degree of correlation. The absolute value of coefficients of 
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correlations of all other each two variables are all smaller than 0.39, which means they 
have a weak relationship with each other.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of the firms with data on employee wages based on the 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry classification. There are 3,733 
unique firms reporting the labor expenses in our data sample. The “Manufacturing” 
companies have the largest proportion among all the firms, which is 28.93%. Table 4 
reports the average employee pay among different industries. We find that the workers in 
“Construction” industry tend to have the highest average wage and the workers in 
“Wholesale Trade” industry tend to have the lowest average wage. In addition, the average 
wage in “Transportation” grows sharply since 2000. 
 
4.2 CEO Equity-Based Compensation (EBC) 
 
In order to capture EBC packages to CEOs more precisely, we measure them as the 
sensitivities, not the exact number of total amount of EBC, in the sense that the amount of 
EBC granted to different CEOs changes as a result of their transactions such as selling 
stocks or exercising stock options to raise cash for CEOs. More specifically, CEOs with 
high EBC but less transactions and CEOs with low EBC but more transactions might show 
the same amount of compensation. However, the pay-performance sensitivities and pay-
volatility sensitivities will always remain different for different CEOs, which is why we 
use PPS and PVS to gauge EBC to CEOs. 
When we estimate PPS and PVS, we first calculate the option value following the 
method proposed by Core and Guay (2002) which is based on the Black-Scholes (1973) 
model for European call options and modified by Merton (1973) to add the dividend item. 
 
                                Option value = [S𝑒−𝑑𝑇N(Z) − X𝑒−𝑟𝑇N(Z − σ√𝑇)]                        (1) 
 
where Z = [ln (
𝑆
𝑋
) + T (r − d +
𝜎2
2
)] /σ√𝑇, N = cumulative probability function for the 
normal distribution, S = price of the underlying stock, X = exercise price of the option, σ 
= expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option, r = risk-free interest rate, T = 
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time to maturity of the option in years, d = expected dividend yield over the life of the 
option. 
Then we are able to calculate Delta for stock options, using the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model. To compute the overall Delta for each CEO-year, we add up the Delta of all vested 
and unvested tranches of options and the Delta of shares. For the overall Vega, we sum up 
the Vega of all vested and unvested tranches of options.4 









                  = [𝑒−𝑑𝑇𝑁(𝑍) × #𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + #𝑆ℎ𝑟. 𝑜𝑤𝑛] × (
Stock price
100
)                              (2)    
 
PVS (sensitivity with respect to 0.01 change in stock-return volatility) is estimated as: 
 
                     [
∂(Option value)
∂(Stock volatility)
] × 0.01 = 𝑒−𝑑𝑇𝑁′(𝑍) × 𝑆√𝑇 × 0.01 × #𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠          (3)   
where 𝑁′= normal density function. 
When we examine whether the EBC package to CEOs lead them to suppress employee 
wages in order to improve the operating performance and stock-price performance, we start 
using both PPS and PVS as measures of EBC in the regression analysis. 
 
4.3 Employee Wages, Capital Structure and Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we run an OLS model with year and 
industry dummies. 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏2𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
                  +𝜏6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏8Quits𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                               (4) 
 
                                                          
4 See Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973), Merton, R. C. (1973), and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
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In this model, 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the natural log of PPS to the CEO of firm i in year t. 𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is 
the natural log of PVS to the CEO of firm i in year t. 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the natural log of sales 
of per employee of firm i in year t. We use 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  to gauge the productivity of 
employees in the firm, so we expect 𝜏3 to be positive. According to Berk, Stanton and 
Zechner (2010) who propose that companies that are more capital intensive tend to pay 
employee higher wages, we also include physical capital intensity variable in our model 
which is 𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 and expect it to be a factor influencing the employee pay positively. Quits𝑖,𝑡 
is the quits rates of firm i in year t. Other variables have the same definitions as in Eq. (4). 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is the year dummy variable. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the industry dummy variable. According to 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we expect 𝜏1 to be negative and 𝜏3 to be positive. 
 
4.4 Heckman Two-Step Analysis 
 
While we use labor expenses to compute average employee wages, many firms do not 
report labor expenses, which become missing in the COMPUSTAT database. When firms 
intentionally choose not to report labor expenses, the firms’ choice leads to a potential 
sample selection bias. If firms with low PPS and with high average wage choose not to 
report labor expenses, our analysis can be spurious. To overcome the selection bias 
problem, we conduct the two-step analysis as in Heckman (1979). Chemmanur, Cheng and 
Zhang (2013) also recognize numerous missing values in labor expenses and perform a 
Heckman two-step analysis to overcome the potential selection bias. Therefore, we utilize 
the Heckman two-step analysis to resolve our concerns on sample-selection bias in testing 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. 
In the first step, we run a Probit model of whether the data of employee pay is missing 
which is shown as Eq. (5). The dependent variable, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡, is one if the firm has data of 
employee pay and zero otherwise. In the first step model, we include the dummies of the 
firm’s listing exchange which is 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 in Eq. (5) to capture different reporting behaviors 
by the firms. And the other variables are the same as in Eq. (4). 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 




In the second step, we run an OLS regression model to examine the impact of PPS 
and firm leverage on employee wages, respectively, as is shown as Eq. (6). The data sample 
in this model only contains the firms of which the data of employee wages are non-missing. 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
                 +𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑚𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                         (6) 
 
In Eq. (6), 𝐼𝑚𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse Mills ratio generated from the selection model in the 
first step and then used as an independent variable in the second step. The rationality of 
adding the inverse Mills ratio into the regression procedure is proposed by Heckman (1979) 
and Tobin (1958), which is making the parameters derived from regression model unbiased. 
Other variables have the same definitions as in Eq. (5). 
 
4.5 Technology Firms versus Non-Technology Firms 
 
In this section, we study the impact of pay-performance sensitivities on employee 
wages in different industries to test Hypothesis 3. Based on the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code, we divide our data into two subsets: technology firms and non-
technology firms. Technology firms are defined as the firms engaged in the fields of 
computer, software, internet, telecommunications and networking. Firms for which the SIC 
code is not less than 4000 are technology firms and otherwise are the non-technology ones. 
We run the regression model according to Eq. (7) which is shown as below for the 
technology firms and non-technology firms separately. The other variables are the same as 
in Eq. (4). 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
                  +𝜏6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                  (7) 
 
We assume that the influence of pay-performance sensitivities on employee wages 
should be somehow different in technology firms and non-technology firms. Moreover, we 
run a statistical test which is shown as Eq. (8) below to examine the difference of the 
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coefficients of PPS for average employee wage in technology firms and non-technology 
firms. 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛾6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8(𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (8) 
 
In this model, we use 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡  as a dummy variable, which is one if the firm is a 
technology firm and zero otherwise. Here, 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is also acting as an industry dummy 
variable. And we use the slope for the product of 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡  to indicate the 
difference between the coefficients of pay-performance sensitivities for employee wages 
in technology firms and non-technology firms, which are represented as 𝛾𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ  and 
𝛾𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ , respectively. More specifically, the term (𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡  will test the 
hypothesis which is shown below. 
 
𝐻0: 𝛾𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ = 𝛾𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ   ;    𝐻1: 𝛾𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ ≠ 𝛾𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ 
 
If the term (𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡  is statistically significant, then we reject the null 
hypothesis, which means that 𝛾𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ is significantly different from 𝛾𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ. And 𝛾8 is the 
difference between 𝛾𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ and 𝛾𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ. 
 
4.6 Business Cycles 
 
We examine the impact of pay-performance sensitivities on employee wages during 
different business cycles to test Hypothesis 4. Recall that we measure business cycles of 
the firms using bankruptcy probabilities. In order to predict the possibility of a firm going 
into bankruptcy, we introduce Z-score firstly proposed by Altman (1968) in our model 
when examining the impact of PPS on employee wages. More specifically, a higher Z-
score of the firm indicates a lower probability of the firm going bankrupt, which means the 
firm is undergoing a good state of the business cycle. When the Z-score is low, the situation 
is quite the opposite.  
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In order to include more firms when categorizing firms using Z-score, we compute Z-
score using the method in line with that improved by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) based on the theory of Altman (1968): Z-
score=1.2𝑇1+1.4𝑇2+3.3𝑇3+0.6𝑇4+𝑇5, where 𝑇1=working capital/total assets; 𝑇2=retained 
earnings/total assets; 𝑇3=earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; 𝑇4=market value of 
equity/book value of total liabilities; 𝑇5 =sales/total assets. Based on the formula, we 
compute the Z-score for each firm-year observation during Jan. 1992 to Dec. 2014, and 
then categorize the firms into financially safe firms and financially distressed firms. We 
define the firms with Z-score above or equal to 2.99 are financially safe firms and those 
with Z-score below or equal to 1.8 are financially distressed firms. We run the regression 
model according to Eq. (7) for the financially safe firms and financially distressed firms 
separately. 
We conjecture that there will be some differences in the influence of pay-performance 
sensitivities on employee wages in different states of business cycles. Moreover, we run a 
statistical test which is shown as Eq. (9) below to examine the difference of the coefficients 
of PPS for average employee pay over business cycles. 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
                  +𝜆6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆7𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆8(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                         (9) 
 
We use 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 as a dummy variable, which is one if the firm is in a good state and 
zero otherwise. When we add a dummy variable indicating the state of the firm, we do not 
include the industry dummy variable in order to avoid the interaction effects. We use the 
slope for the product of 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡  to indicate the difference between the 
coefficients of 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 for employee wages in firms in a good state and firms in a bad state, 
which are represented as 𝜆𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑  and 𝜆𝐵𝑎𝑑 , respectively. More specifically, the term 
(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡 will test the hypothesis which is shown below. 
 




If the term (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡  is statistically significant, then we reject the null 
hypothesis, which means that 𝜆𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 is significantly different from 𝜆𝐵𝑎𝑑. And 𝜆8 is the 
difference between 𝜆𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑  and 𝜆𝐵𝑎𝑑. 
 
4.7 Robustness Checks 
 
We check the robustness of the models with regard to two issues: endogeneity and 
alternative variable measures. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when managers have 
little or no ownership of the firm, they may avoid some projects which provide positive 
NPVs to the firm. When the managers are given EBC, the situation will be reverse. The 
more investments managers try to make, the higher leverage firms will have. Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) also propose that such managerial incentives are more related to the 
increase of the debt-equity ratio which is defined as leverage.  
As proposed by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Parsons and Titman (2009), when the 
firm has high leverage, the firm tends to have more tangible assets in support. Meanwhile, 
the firm may also need to pay employees higher wages to guarantee these assets well 
operated. Therefore, the positive relation between the firm leverage and employee wages 
emerges, which creates the potential endogeneity problem. Following the method of 
Wooldridge (2002), we control for this endogeneity problem by employing the 
instrumental variable regressions with a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression 
procedure. 
In the first stage, we need to introduce an instrumental variable which is related to 
leverage ratio but unrelated to the employee wages. The model of the first stage is displayed 
as Eq. (10). Here we utilize marginal tax rates based on income before interest expense has 
been deducted (𝑀𝑇𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡) as instrumental variable because it can meet the requirements 
(Givoly, Hayn, Ofer and Sarig, 1992). We use (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡  to purely capture the 
efficiency of a firm in generating returns from its assets, without being influenced by 
management financing decisions. And 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡  is the standard deviation of 
(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡, acting as a proxy for the volatility of the efficiency of squeezing profits 




𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑇𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡        
+𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                  (10) 
 
And then in the second stage, we regress the average employee wage on the fitted 
value of leverage derived in the first stage. The model is shown below as Eq. (11). Except 
for the leverage ratio, other variables are the same as in Eq. (10). 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡      
+𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                          (11)                                                                                             
 
We expect that after we control for the endogeneity problem, the PPS and leverage 
will still determine employee wages negatively and positively, respectively. 
In addition, to further examine the robustness of our variables, we use another measure 
for the CEO’s performance except for PPS, which is the excess return (𝐸𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡). Moreover, 
to study the interaction effect of these two variables, we add a cross product item of these 
two proxies which is indicated as (𝐸𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡. The model we construct is shown 
below in Eq. (12). Other variables are the same as in Eq. (4). 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 




We first provide the empirical findings of the income inequality in the U.S. 
corporations. Secondly, we further analyze how average employee pay is influenced by 
pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as well as other control variables and provide more 
empirical findings of the regression analysis. Moreover, we investigate the relation 
between pay-performance sensitivities and employee wages in both technology firms and 
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non-technology firms. Lastly, we analyze how pay-performance sensitivities affect 
employee wages within different business cycles.  
 
5.1 Income Inequality 
 
We divide the time period in our data sample into three sub-periods: 1992-2000; 2001-
2007; 2008-2014, and examine the income inequality within U.S. corporations. Table 5 
provides an overview of such an income inequality. First of all, Table 5 reports the ratio of 
average annual total labor expenses to annual total operating expenses of the firms. It shows 
that the ratio ranges from 18% during 2008-2014 to approximately 26% during 1992-2000, 
which means that the total labor expenses occupy a significant portion of total operating 
expenses. Therefore, it is meaningful to study the employee wages and how the difference 
between CEO compensation and employee wages will lead to a more severe income 
inequality even all over the whole society.  
Table 5 also provides the comparison of average employee pay with the compensation 
to CEOs as well as the top 5 executives in the firms. We find that the average of annual 
compensation to top 5 executives is about 20 times to the average employee wage. What 
is even worse is that the average of annual compensation to the CEO is approximately 45-
70 times more than that of an average employee. Moreover, we can find that pay-
performance sensitivities of CEOs have risen from the first sub-period (1992-2000) to the 
second sub-period (2001-2007) and then fallen from the second sub-period (2001-2007) to 
the third sub-period (2008-2014), which means pay-performance sensitivities have 
undergone an increase followed by a decrease during the time period from 1992 to 2014 
overall. This is consistent with the views of Kaplan (2012) and Frydman and Jenter (2010), 
who argue that the CEO pay has ascended substantially from 1993 to 2000 and then has 
declined from 2000 to 2010. Our findings are consistent with Kim, Kogut and Yang (2015), 
who also argue that the income gap between top earners including managers and executives, 
and lower-level employees is a primary cause for the sharp increase in the U.S. inequality 
since the late 1970s. 
 




In the multiple-regression analysis of employee wages, we run a series of OLS 
regressions using the model in Eq. (4), which are presented in Table 6. We find evidence 
that the average employee pay is related to PPS and firm leverage. Column 1 of Table 6 
shows the relation between PPS and average employee pay and also the relation between 
the leverage and average employee pay, with the average sales per employee and firm size 
as control variables. The coefficient of PPS as -0.0310 is significant at the 1% level. With 
this coefficient, we compute the incremental wage changes relative to changes in PPS. 
Starting from the median PPS at $205,999 as shown in Table 1, we find that the level of 
the natural log of PPS increases by 2.8001 when we increase PPS by one standard deviation 
at $3,182,026, holding everything else constant. The natural log of average employee pay 
decreases by 0.0868 (=0.0310 ×2.8001). Considering the median employee wages is 
$57,503 in Table 1 and the impact of PPS on employee wages, we note that the natural log 
of average employee pay declines from 10.9596 to 10.8728 (=10.9596-0.0068), which are 
translated from $57,503 to $52,722. Therefore, the average employee wage decreases by 
$4,781 (or 8.31%) when a CEO with median PPS receives one standard deviation more in 
his PPS. 
Interpreting other control variables in Column 1 of Table 6, we find that large firms 
pay high wages to their employees consistent with Brown and Medoff (1989). Employees 
are paid more as firms increase average sales per employee. Furthermore, as firms increase 
leverage, they pay their employees more to compensate additional risk-taking from 
increased leverage. These findings remain consistent in other columns and are consistent 
with Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013). Examining other columns in Table 6, we find 
that physical capital intensity and the market-to-book ratio have positive effects on average 
employee pay. It appears that firms with more physical capital and growth opportunities 
pay their employees more.  
In column 5 of Table 6, we add PVS as a potential measure for EBC instead of PPS. 
We find that the coefficient of PVS at 0.0001 is not significant. Since PVS to the CEO does 
not seem to affect employee wages as expected, we focus our analysis on PPS from now 
on. Column 6 of Table 6 presents the result of full regression model. While the market-to-
book ratio is not significant any more, other variables such as PPS, firm size, leverage, 
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average sales per employee, and physical capital intensity remain significant as before. 
When we include the quits rate to the OLS estimation in Column 6 of Table 6, we note that 
the coefficient of quits rate is not significant at -0.0034. The annual quits rate does not 
seem to affect average employee pay. While Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) find 
the coefficient significant when they have the quits rate alone in the regression model, they 
also observe that the quits ratio becomes insignificant when they include other control 
variables. 
Since there are too many missing values of employee wages reported by firms, we 
further conduct a Heckman two step analysis, which is presented in Table 7. There are four 
columns in Table 7 and different control variables are included in the models for different 
columns. In the first step, we employ a Probit model, which is described in Eq. (5). Panel 
A of Table 7 provides the results for the first step. The coefficients of PPS in the model for 
each column are negative and significant at the 1% level. Firm size and firm leverage has 
positive and significant coefficients in the model for each column. Average sales per 
employee also has a positive and significant coefficient in the model for each column. In 
Column 3 and Column 4 of Panel A, we include physical capital intensity into the Probit 
estimation model. We observe that the coefficient of physical capital intensity is positive 
and significant in the first step estimation model. From the results of selection model 
presented in Panel A, we observe that larger corporations with high market leverage, lower 
average sales per employee, lower market-to-book ratio, and higher physical capital 
intensity tend to report labor expenses.  
In the second step, we only choose the firms with valid employee wages data as our 
data sample and run a series of OLS regressions according to Eq. (6). We include the 
inverse Mills ratio derived from the first step as one of the independent variables in the 
second step model. The results for the second step regression are presented in Panel B of 
Table 7. We find that the coefficients of PPS in the four columns are -0.0224, -0.0237, -
0.0316 and -0.0338, which are similar to each other and are all significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficients of leverage in the four columns are all positive and significant at the 1% 
level. In addition, the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are negative and statistically 
distinguishable from zero when we do not include physical capital intensity as the control 
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variable in the regression for the second step model, which means that the inverse Mills 
ratio makes contribution to making parameters of the regression model unbiased. We can 
conclude that after we resolve the sample selection bias problem, the impacts of PPS and 
firm leverage on average employee wage remain negative and positive respectively, and 
are also significant, consistent with the results displayed in Table 6. 
From the results displayed in Table 6 and Table 7, we can conclude that the average 
employee pay tends to increase as well when firm leverage increases. This is consistent 
with the findings of Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) as well as Berk, Stanton and 
Zechner (2010). Moreover, CEOs with higher pay-performance sensitivities tend to 
suppress employee wages, which will generate higher firm performance and then get higher 
compensation. Hence, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are both supported. 
 
5.3 Employee Wages Analysis in Technology Firms and Non-Technology Firms 
In Hypothesis 3, we further examine the relationship between pay performance 
sensitivities and employee wages in different industries by categorizing the firms in our 
data sample into technology firms and non-technology firms. We run several OLS 
regression models based on Eq. (7). We do not include quits rate here because it is not a 
significant determinant to average employee wage as shown in Table 6. Table 8 reports the 
coefficients and standard errors obtained from OLS regressions of employee wages in 
technology firms and nontechnology firms separately. When testing the association 
between PPS and average employee wage, we use firm size and market leverage as control 
variables, and we add more control variables into the models in different columns. With 
more control variables, the adjusted R square also increases, which makes the model better 
to support our hypothesis. For instance, in Panel A of Table 8, the adjusted R square 
changes from 0.8485 in column 1 to 0.8628 in column 4. Comparing Panel A and Panel B 
of Table 8, we notice that the market-to-book ratio of the firm which measures the 
investment opportunities influence the employee wages more significantly in technology 
firms than in non-technology firms. In addition, we find that firm size and firm leverage 
have positive and significant effects on average employee wages for both technology firms 
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and non-technology firms. More importantly, the coefficients of PPS in different columns 
in both Panel A and Panel B are significantly and negatively signed.  
Next, we use a statistical test to examine whether there is a difference between the 
coefficients of PPS across technology and non-technology firms. Table 9 shows the results 
of the statistical test. We can note that the coefficient of the product of the dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm is a technology or non-technology firm and PPS is positive and 
statistically significant for each column. Therefore, we can conclude that the coefficient of 
PPS for average employee wage is bigger in non-technology firms. Overall, the effect of 
PPS on employee wages is greater for non-technology firms than for technology firms. 
More specifically, the phenomenon whereby CEOs with higher EBC will tend to pay lower 
employee wages is more pronounced in non-technology firms. This is plausible in that 
according to Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010), the employees are more entrenched in 
highly levered firms. Consistent with the previous literature, non-technology firms have a 
higher leverage than technology firms. Therefore, employees in non-technology firms have 
a higher degree of entrenchment. When the employees are faced with high degree of 
entrenchment, they are more afraid of bankruptcy and less likely to leave the firm. Hence, 
their wages are more sensitive to the EBC. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
 
5.4 Employee Wages Analysis over Business Cycles 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we categorize firms in our data sample into financially 
safe firms which means the companies are in a good state and financially distressed firms 
which means the companies are in a bad state. Running a series of OLS regression models 
based on Eq. (7), we present the results of OLS regressions of employee wages over 
different business cycles in Table 10. We select firm size and leverage as our main control 
variables. Column 3 in either Panel A or Panel B display the full-regressor model which 
includes all of the control variables. In full model tests for both firms in a good state and 
firms in a bad state, the coefficients of PPS are -0.0273 and -0.0362, respectively, which 
are also statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficients of PPS in the two states tend to be different. We use a statistical test 
to examine whether there is difference between the coefficients of PPS across different 
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business cycles. Table 11 shows the results of the statistical test. We observe that the 
coefficient of the product of the dummy variable indicating whether the firm is in a good 
state or a bad state and PPS is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for each 
column. Therefore, we can conclude that the coefficient of PPS for average employee wage 
is bigger in financially distressed firms. Overall, the effect of PPS on employee wages is 
greater for firms in a bad state than for firms in a good state. The finding is reasonable in 
the context of Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010), who propose that employee entrenchment 
is higher in firms with higher leverage. One of the basic assumptions of their model is that 
higher leverage is related to higher probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, firms in a bad 
state tend to have highly entrenched employees whose wages are more sensitive to EBC. 
Hence, Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
 
5.5 Robustness Checks 
 
Table 12 and Table 13 illustrate the results of our robustness checks. Firstly, we 
address the endogeneity problem using a two-stage least square (2SLS) model. For the first 
stage, we run a series of OLS regressions based on Eq. (7) and the results are presented in 
Panel A of Table 12. The four columns of Panel A represent for four models with different 
control variables. We can find that the marginal tax rate, which is the instrumental variable, 
is negative and statistically significant. The full model regression in Column 4 of Panel A 
shows a marginal tax rate coefficient of -0.2368. The results in the first stage confirm that 
the marginal tax rate is a strong instrument. For the second stage, we run a series of OLS 
regressions based on Eq. (10) and the results are presented in Panel B of Table 12. It is 
apparent that firm size and average sales per employee are positive determinants and also 
significant at the 1% level, consistent with the findings from our OLS regressions presented 
in Table 6. More importantly, we notice from our second stage regression that, after 
utilizing the marginal tax rate as the instrumental variable to control for the potential 
endogeneity problem, as every column in Panel B of Table 12 illustrates, the coefficients 
of PPS are -0.0344, -0.0277, -0.0450 and -0.0791, which are statistically significant. 
Therefore, PPS continues to be a negative and significant determinant of employee wages. 
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Table 13 presents the results of our robustness check of changing variable measure. 
We also gauge the interaction effect of PPS and excess return using a cross product item 
of PPS and excess return. In Column 1 to Column 3 of Table 13, we replace the PPS with 
excess return and find that the coefficients of excess return for all of the columns are all 
non-significant. In Column 4 of Table 13, we run a full model test by adding PPS into the 
regression and find that PPS has a coefficient of -0.0254 which is significant, and excess 
return has a coefficient of 0.0141 which is non-significant. We can also notice that the 
coefficients of excess return and the interaction item are both non-significant as shown in 
Column 4. Therefore, PPS has a great impact on employee wages and cannot be replaced 
by excess return when we study the determinants of employee wages. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Executive compensation and income inequality have always been topics that are hotly 
discussed worldwide. In this paper, we examine the relationship between CEO equity-
based compensation (EBC) and employee wages in the profitable corporations. We use 
pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) to precisely 
measure EBC. Through comparing the wages of average employees with the total 
compensation of CEOs, we can find out that there is a prevalent and severe income 
inequality problem even inside the profitable corporations, which is also the economic 
significance of relationship between pay-performance sensitivities and employee wages on 
the income inequality all over the society. 
We employ several models to provide evidence that EBC will lead to income 
inequality within the firms. First, we investigate the impact of PPS on average employee 
wage by conducting regression analysis and find out that CEOs with high EBC are more 
likely to suppress average employee pay to improve the firm performance, which will lead 
to higher CEO compensation as well as their own benefits. Hence, income inequality within 
the companies between CEOs and average employees is widened. Moreover, we examine 
such an impact in different industries. We classify firms into technology firms and non-
technology firms and then provide evidence that in non-technology firms, CEOs with 
higher PPS are more likely to suppress employee wages. Furthermore, comparing the 
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effects of EBC on employee wages within different business cycles, we find that in firms 
which are in a bad state, such an effect is stronger. Therefore, these results have practical 
implications for researchers and practitioners in the sense that high level of EBC do curb 
average employee wages and then lead to income inequality problems even within 
corporations. Moreover, despite the fact that EBC can mitigate the agency problem of 
managers and shareholders effectively, it will create another aspect of agency conflict 
between CEOs and shareholders. This can lead to reductions in firm value by reducing 
productivity and thus, expected future cash flows (or something to that effect). As a result, 
we suggest that firms grant EBC also to average employees based on their performance in 
order to reduce income inequality in modern corporations. 
Even though there is some literature about how managerial powers influence 
employee wages, to our knowledge, no one has considered how employee wages react to 
PPS, especially during different business cycles. This paper contributes to the existing 
literature by examining the impact of EBC on employee wages directly, as well as 
explaining why executive compensation provided mostly by EBC will worsen income 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables  
Variable n Mean St.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Wage 3,255 75,989.64 71,936.34 3.59 39,595.70 57,503.04 84,735.70 857,271.03 
PPS 3,255 879,276.12 
3,182,026.0
0 
0 66,710.80 205,998.70 681,794.00 
75,718,492.
86 
PVS 3,255 113,643.32 251,833.10 0 0 24,576.90 107,300.00 
3,000,992.3
5 
Size 3,255 21.62 1.66 12.96 20.00 21.54 23.00 25.98 
Leverage 3,255 0.28 0.25 0 0.09 0.22 0.41 1.00 
Avgsale 3,255 369,672.83 
1,000,152.4
1 
10,978.63 119,320.00 209,854.70 386,280.00 
21,219,726.
03 
MTB 3,255 1.78 1.07 0.35 1.14 1.42 2.03 14.41 
PCI 3,255 0.65 0.47 0 0.18 0.65 1.04 2.39 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of the key variables. Wage is the average employee pay in the firm; PPS is the Pay Performance Sensitivity; 
PVS is the Pay Volatility Sensitivity; Size is the firm size; Leverage is firm leverage, which is measured as market leverage; Avgsale is the average sales 
per employee. MTB is market-to-book ratio of the firm; PCI is the physical capital intensity of the firm; All of the variables in the data sample also range 









Table 2: Sample correlations of key variables of multivariate analysis of Employee 
Wages 
 Wage PPS PVS Size Leverage Avgsale MTB PCI 
Wage 1        
PPS 0.073 1       
PVS 0.132 0.470 1      
Size 0.307 0.575 0.517 1     
Leverage 0.138 -0.341 -0.097 -0.214 1    
Avgsale 0.684 0.103 0.143 0.386 0.039 1   
MTB -0.120 0.261 0.072 0.218 -0.484 -0.065 1  
PCI -0.130 -0.069 -0.006 -0.005 0.120 -0.036 -0.164 1 
This table provides Pearson correlations between the key variables of multivariate analysis of Employee 
Wages. Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the firm; Size is the firm size; Leverage is firm 
leverage, which is measured as market leverage; Avgsale is the average sales per employee; MTB is market-
to-book ratio of the firm; PCI is the physical capital intensity of the firm. PPS is the natural log of the Pay 
Performance Sensitivity; This data sample contains 2326 firm-year observations from fiscal year 1992 to 


















Table 3: Sample Distribution by two-digit SIC industry classification 
SIC Industry Description Number Percentage (%) 
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 20 0.54 
10-14 Mining 982 26.31 
15-17 Construction 22 0.59 
20-39 Manufacturing 1,080 28.93 
40-49 Transportation 447 11.97 
50-51 Wholesale Trade 95 2.54 
52-59 Retail Trade 237 6.35 
70-89 Services 774 20.73 
91-99 Public Administration 76 2.04 
Total  3,733 100 
This table shows the distribution of firms reporting data on labor expenses into different industries. The data 






















Time Period 1 
(1992-2000) 
Time Period 2 
(2001-2007) 




51,551.14 50,324.43 47,280.72 
Mining 164,322.93 103,821.81 116,041.05 
Construction 341,523.27 41,814.83 80,761.67 
Manufacturing 46,621.56 68,493.96 97,272.31 
Transportation 47,376.25 215,459.12 312,661.25 
Wholesale Trade 45,863.30 75,759.69 74,391.70 
Retail Trade 65,480.37 17,793.34 24,446.36 
Services 47,572.49 60,232.75 88,613.52 
Public Administration 49,705.63 62,143.25 87,349.50 
This table shows the annual average employee wage individually in different industries during the three time 



















Table 5: Expenses to workers of different levels during sub-periods 
 
Time Period 1 
(1992-2000) 
Time Period 2 
(2001-2007) 
Time Period 3 
(2008-2014) 
Labor Expenses 785,076,751.00 1,117,343,559.00 923,413,498.00 
Operating Expenses 3,066,815,794.00 5,002,908,441.00 5,104,788,634.00 
Ratio of Labor 
Expenses 
to Operating Expenses 
0.26 0.22 0.18 
CEO---TDC1 3,808,469.31 5,149,982.56 5,600,908.89 
CEO---TDC2 3,418,681.12 5,512,447.41 7,128,673.39 
CEO---PPS 1,416,486.15 1,340,814.08 780,313.52 
Top 5 executives---
TDC1 
1,322,393.92 1,789,552.44 2,075,630.14 
Top 5 executives---
TDC2 
1,057,739.72 1,756,548.02 2,314,893.85 
Average Employee 
Wage 
55,090.26 99,403.41 128,735.45 
This table shows the comparison of average annual labor expense average with annual total operating expense 
as well as the comparison of the average annual compensation to CEOs and top 5 executives with the annual 
average employee wage in the firm during the three time periods: from 1992 to 2000; from 2001 to 2007; 
and from 2008-2014. TDC1 is total compensation which is comprised of: salary, bonus, other annual, total 
value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term 
incentive payouts, and all other total. TDC2 is also total compensation which is measured in another way. 
TDC2 is composed of: salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stock granted, net value of stock 
options exercised, long-term incentive payouts, and all other total. PPS is the Pay Performance Sensitivity. 
All of the data items in this table are collected individually. The units of the data on Employee Wages, 
Operating Expenses, TDC1, TDC2, PPS and Average Employee Wage are one dollar. 
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Table 6: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of Employee Wages 






























































































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2326 2326 2326 2326 1813 1316 
Adj R2 0.7231 0.7243 0.7282 0.7288 0.7088 0.7325 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of 
average employee wage. The dependent variable is the average employee wage. Wage is the natural log of 
average employee pay in the firm; PPS is the natural log of the Pay Performance Sensitivity; PVS is the 
natural log of the Pay Volatility Sensitivity; Leverage is measured as market leverage; The Quits Rate is 
collected from 2001 to 2014. The other variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2014. 
Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 






Table 7: Heckman two step analysis of Employee Wages 
Panel A: First Step---Probit model of firms reporting data on employee wages 




















































Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 26286 26286 26286 26286 
     
Panel B: Second Step---OLS regression of employee wages in firms with data on employee 
wages 






































































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2326 2326 2326 2326 
Adj R2 0.7249 0.7253 0.7281 0.7289 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors obtained from a Heckman two-step analysis model of 
average employee wage. In the first step, we employ a probit model of whether the firm has data on employee 
wages. The dependent variable in the model for the first step is denoted as “pro”. And it is one if the data on 
employee wages are not missing and zero otherwise. In the second step, we run an OLS regression model of 
employee wages. The dependent variable in the model for the second step is the average employee wage. 
The inverse mills ratio derived from the selection model for the first step is added into the OLS regression 
for the second step as an independent variable. Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the firm; 
PPS is the natural log of the Pay Performance Sensitivity; Leverage is measured as market leverage. All of 
the variables in the data sample for both the first and second steps range from fiscal year 1992 to 2014. 
Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
















Table 8: Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Employee Wages: OLS regressions in technology firms and non-technology 
firms 
Variables Panel A: Technology Firms Panel B: Non-Technology Firms 













































































































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1586 1586 1586 1586 740 740 740 740 
Adj R2 0.8485 0.8528 0.8606 0.8628 0.3312 0.3321 0.3370 0.3383 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of average employee wage in technology firms and nontechnology firms, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the average employee wage. Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the firm; PPS is the natural log of the Pay Performance Sensitivity; Leverage is measured 
as market leverage. All of the variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2014. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Difference of coefficients of Pay-Performance Sensitivity for Employee 
Wages in technology firms and non-technology firms 













































































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2326 2326 2326 2326 
Adj R2 0.4770 0.4782 0.4945 0.4971 
This table reports the difference of the coefficients of PPS on employee wages in different industries. 
Technology is a dummy variable, which is one if the firm is a technology firm, and zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable is the average employee wage. Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the 
firm; PPS is the natural log of the Pay Performance Sensitivity; Product of Technology and PPS is the product 
of dummy variable and PPS; Leverage is measured as market leverage. All of the variables in the data sample 
range from fiscal year 1992 to 2014. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** 





Table 10: Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Employee Wages over business cycles 
Variables Panel A: Financially Safe Firms Panel B: Financially Distressed Firms 























































































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1367 1367 1367 563 563 563 
Adj R2 0.6956 0.6933 0.6983 0.7701 0.7658 0.7697 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of average employee wage within different business 
cycles. The dependent variable is the average employee wage. Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the firm; PPS is the natural log of the 
Pay Performance Sensitivity; Leverage is measured as market leverage. All of the variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2014. 
Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 11: Difference of coefficients of Pay-Performance Sensitivity for Employee 
Wages over business cycles 





























































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No 
Obs 1930 1930 1930 
Adj R2 0.4653 0.4520 0.4687 
This table reports the difference of the coefficients of PPS on employee wages over business cycles. State is 
a dummy variable, which is one if the firm is in a good state, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is 
the average employee wage. Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the firm; PPS is the natural 
log of the Pay Performance Sensitivity; Product of State and PPS is the product of dummy variable and PPS; 
Leverage is measured as market leverage. All of the variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 
to 2014. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 






Table 12: Instrumental variable regressions of Employee Wages: Two stage least 
square regression analysis 
Panel A: First Stage---Leverage is the dependent variable 




































































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2176 2176 2176 2176 
Adj R2 0.2744 0.3873 0.2755 0.4402 
     
Panel B: Second Stage---Average Employee pay is the dependent variable 






































































Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2176 2176 2176 2176 
Adj R2 0.7217 0.7240 0.7212 0.6544 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors obtained from the instrumental variable regressions of 
employee wages. We implement two stage least square (2SLS) regression model. In the first stage, we use 
the marginal tax rate based on income before interest expense has been deducted (MTRB) as the instrumental 
variable. And the dependent variable is leverage which is measured as market leverage. In the second stage, 
the fitted value of leverage derived from the first stage is included in the OLS regression model as an 
independent variable. The dependent variable in the model for the second stage is average employee wage. 
Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the firm; PPS is the natural log of the Pay Performance 
Sensitivity. All of the variables in the data sample for both the first and second stages range from fiscal year 
1992 to 2012. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** indicate statistical 









Table 13: Interaction effect of Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Excess return in the 
OLS regressions of Employee Wages 


























































item of PPS and 
Excess return 











Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 843 843 843 843 
Adj R2 0.8480 0.8554 0.8499 0.8590 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of 
average employee wage with examining the robustness of PPS using excess return. The dependent variable 
is the average employee wage. Wage is the natural log of average employee pay in the firm; PPS is the natural 
log of the Pay Performance Sensitivity; Leverage is measured as market leverage. We also include a cross 
product item of PPS and excess return, which can capture the interaction effect of these two variables in the 
regression model. All of the variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2014. Numbers in 
the parentheses are the standard errors.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
